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Abstract Counting casualties in conﬂict zones faces both practical and ethical concerns.
Drawing on procedures from risk analysis, we propose a general approach. It represents each
death by standard features, having either essential value, for capturing the social and cultural
meaning of individual casualties, or instrumental value, for relating patterns of casualties to
possible causes and effects. We illustrate the approach with the choices involved in attempts
to record casualties in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conﬂict, and with natural disasters,
as exempliﬁed by Hurricane Katrina. We advocate institutionalizing the approach, so that
recording casualties increases understanding, rather than suspicion.
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Countingcasualtiesispartofanyconﬂict.Thepartiesmustdoitbothtomonitortheconﬂict’s
progress and to give it meaning (Department of Defense, 2005; Graham, 2005; Holt, 2006).
Without accurate counts, the situation is obscured and the fallen are dishonored. If these
failures appear deliberate, then they may aggravate the conﬂict, by adding insult to injury.
Political scientists need these counts for their own reasons: creating narrative accounts,
providing policy advice, and testing theories of conﬂict and reconciliation (e.g., Daponte,
2003; Epstein, 2002; Peterson, 2002; Walzer, 1992).
The work is grim and challenging. The recorders face not only the risks of work in a
conﬂict zone, but also the wrath of those who want the story told a particular way or not told
at all. For example, whatever its motives, the Bush Administration has fed suspicions that it
was obscuring the cost of the Iraq war by not counting casualties among Iraqi civilians (Fisk,
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2005)andprivatesecurityservices(Bergner,2005;icasualties.org,2005),andbynotmaking
itstallyofCoalitioncasualtiesreadilyaccessible(Conyersetal.,2005;icasualties.org,2003).
Neglecting non-Western civilian deaths has been cited as undermining global cooperation
in the struggle against violent extremism (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2003; Sachs, 2004;
Tavernise, 2005).
The issues faced when counting casualties are special cases of concerns that arise when
measuring any socially deﬁned phenomenon. We draw on this research legacy in order to
develop an approach to recording casualties in conﬂict zones capable of producing counts
that serve the needs of multiple parties, with differing goals and ideologies. The framework
treatstherecordingprocessassubjectiveintwosenses:Itreﬂectsvaluejudgments,regarding
what to measure, and professional judgments, regarding how to do the measuring. Explicitly
recognizing these two kinds of judgment is essential if science is to inform politics and vice
versa. Without that recognition, the recording process can be both biased, by embodying
undisclosed values, and ineffective, by investing measurement resources poorly.
The proposed approach also points to the kind of institution needed to develop and
implement a recording protocol, namely, one that has both deep technical expertise and
broad political respect. We illustrate these issues with secondary analyses of two data sets
from the Middle East. Although we focus on international conﬂicts, the approach could
also be used to structure and summarize national deliberations on recording casualties, like
the process convened by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (2001) in order to
standardize death certiﬁcates. In this light, we reﬂect brieﬂy on the expression of these issues
in the Hurricane Katrina disaster. For simplicity’s sake, we focus on recording fatalities.
However, we use the more general term “casualty,” recognizing other forms of suffering and
the analogous issues faced by their assessment.
1 Measurement choices
As an example, consider the task of describing the victims found in the Saddam Hussein-
era mass graves exhumed in Iraq after his regime fell (Drew and Mabile, 2005). Forensic
pathologists can assess a victim’s age and sex relatively well, and the cause of death with
somewhat less conﬁdence. Forensic science advances by reducing these uncertainties and
creating standard procedures, thereby constraining professional judgment, so that practition-
ers increasingly reach the same conclusions (Goodin and Hanzlick, 1997; Hanzlick, 2005;
Institute of Medicine, 2003; U.S. Department of Justice, 1999; Wecht and Weedn, 2005).
However, forensic science alone cannot determine which features of each case are worth
describing. That choice requires value judgments. Those can either be made explicitly or left
embedded in pathologists’ professional practices. Our proposal articulates the rationale for
those choices and the locus of responsibility for making them, when designing a protocol
for recording casualties.
The adequacy of casualty records depends on how they are used. Their purpose can be
essential or instrumental. If the purpose is essential, then the information has inherent value.
For example, recording victims’ sex would partially satisfy the desire to dignify every death
by knowing as much as possible about the victim. It would be especially important for a
society with different death rituals for women and men. If the purpose is instrumental, the
information is a means to an end. That end might be practical, such as determining criminal
charges (e.g., victims’ sex matters, if penalties differ for killing men and women). Or it
might be scientiﬁc, such as understanding a regime’s intimidation practices (e.g., victims’
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sex matters, if it clariﬁes how they are selected) (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Peterson,
2002).
Thesameinformationcouldservebothinstrumentalandessentialpurposes,eachdemand-
ingdifferentdegreesofprecision.Forexample,burialpracticesmightrequireunambiguously
determining features (e.g., age, sex, cause of death, religion) that a scientist might ﬁnd value
in knowing approximately.1 Instrumental features often deﬁne a survivor population, whose
size allows estimating casualty rates (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2004). Essential features of-
ten focus on individual casualties, perhaps making it unseemly to consider the population of
those “merely” exposed to the threat.
Any procedure for recording casualties will serve some purposes better than others. For
example, instrumental purposes conﬂict when scientists disagree about whether to perform
a small number of costly DNA tests or a large number of inexpensive physical exams. Es-
sential purposes conﬂict when records that satisfy one audience ignore features that are vital
to another audience—or include features that it abhors. Instrumental and essential purposes
conﬂict when religious beliefs proscribe autopsies that provide information critical to sci-
entists or law enforcement ofﬁcials. For example, in the United States, some archaeologists
and some Native Americans have disagreed over whether to study or re-inter “Kennewick
Man,” whose prehistoric remains were found in Washington State (Slayman, 1996).
Indeed, whether casualties are recorded at all represents a value judgment. In a widely
cited quote,2 U.S. General Tommy Franks responded to a question regarding the progress of
the Afghanistan campaign with, “We don’t do body counts.” That aspect of the U.S. casualty
recordingprotocolcouldmeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Aninstrumentalargument
supporting this policy is that it avoids a practice that, some say, distorted U.S. conduct of
the Vietnam War, where body counts emphasized the number of enemy dead, rather than the
social, economic, political, and environmental impacts of U.S. actions (Graham, 2005). An
instrumental argument opposing this policy is that not counting casualties loses information
that is essential to understanding the war. An essential argument supporting this policy is
thatcountingbodiesunderminesvictims’dignity,byreducingthemtonumbers.Anessential
argumentagainstthispolicyisthatitdeniesthoseindividualsthedignityofrecognizingtheir
sacriﬁce.
Reporting U.S. casualties in Iraq raises its own policy issues: Should accidental deaths
be distinguished from ones directly due to hostile acts? How long should the counting
period extend, when considering delayed deaths from injury, disease, or suicide? Should
contract worker deaths be included? If so, should the record note whether those individuals
had recently left military service? How should it treat problems attributed to post-traumatic
stress disorder (Vendatam, 2005)? Should it include suicides among family members of the
fallen (Wilson, 2005)?
The latest revision of the U.S. Standard Certiﬁcate of Death (U.S. National Center for
Health Statistics, 2001) added, among other things, questions about pregnancy status, race,
and whether tobacco use had contributed to the death. It declined to add, among other things,
questions about homelessness, citizenship, health insurance, diabetes, and social support. As
ofSeptember7,2005,theNationalAssociationofMedicalExaminers(2005)DeathRegistry
1 Human Rights Watch (2005, footnote 32) reports a communication from the press ofﬁce of the Multi-
National Force citing the practical difﬁculties of recording casualties, arguing, “It would be irresponsible to
give ﬁrm estimates.” That might be a valid defense for an information source criticized for any imprecision
and an invalid one for an information consumer eager for any properly qualiﬁed estimate.
2 A Google search for “Tommy Franks” “body counts” yielded 12,200 hits on August 26, 2005, and 41,400
on October 29, 2006 (recognizing the imperfections in these counts).
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included the following “reportable” causes of death: bioterrorism agent, bomb-related death,
chemical terrorism agent, in custody (in jail, not in jail), lightning strike, product tampering,
(human)stampede,structuralcollapse,TASERused,unexplaineddeathinadultyoungerthan
30 years, and death caused by “unsuspected neoplasm.” One can imagine the instrumental
or essential purposes served (or frustrated) by the decision to include (or exclude) each of
these features.
Both the Certiﬁcate of Death and the Death Registry include guidance on the professional
judgment involved in their implementation. These instructions reﬂect experts’ experience
with the ambiguities of real-life circumstances (decomposing bodies, incomplete chain of
custody, time pressure). They also reﬂect experts’ awareness of the social pressures on the
recording process (e.g., coroners who are also funeral directors, sensitive to families’ wishes
about what gets recorded; families that prohibit autopsies, for religious or criminal reasons).
These guidelines are intended to afford the best chance of satisfying the value judgments
expressed in deciding to consider each feature—recognizing inherent limits, such as the
inferential challenges of assessing the contributory roles of causes with diffuse effects, such
as tobacco or obesity.
All this effort will be misdirected without agreement on the feature set. The next section
describes a general approach to deﬁning that set so as to integrate professional expertise with
social values, in ways that focus experts on the issues that matter most to users of the reports.
It does so by treating casualty recording as a special case of measuring phenomena whose
meaning is socially deﬁned, by users’ essential or instrumental needs.
2 Creating reporting protocols
2.1 Understanding risk
When measuring a socially deﬁned phenomenon, each procedural choice can serve some
ends, while frustrating others. An inﬂuential National Research Council (1996) report ad-
dressed these general issues in the speciﬁc context of measuring risks. It recommended that
any measurement protocol be speciﬁed with an analytical-deliberative process. It begins
by having technical experts analytically develop a set of potentially relevant features, based
on their understanding of the risk and the concerned parties’ needs. Those parties then
deliberatively determine which features they want to consider, reducing or expanding the
initially proposed set. Technical experts can inform these deliberations (e.g., by explaining
empirical measurement problems, by estimating the costs of alternative methods). However,
the choice of measures ultimately depends on the parties’ value judgments. The technical
experts’ priorities matter only if they have stakeholder standing (i.e., if advancing their sci-
ence is a legitimate goal). Other bodies have echoed variants on this procedure (e.g., Cabinet
Strategy Ofﬁce, 2002; Canadian Standards Association, 1997; Environmental Protection
Agency, 2000; Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk, 1998; Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution, 1998; Treasury Board, 2002).
In a precursor to these reports, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1993) con-
ducted several dozen state and regional consultations following a similar process, as part of
setting its risk management priorities. In collaboration with technical experts, participants in
each consultation identiﬁed a set of features characterizing the risks that mattered to them.
Technical experts then assessed the risks in terms of those features. The participants used
that description to make policy recommendations (e.g., how much to invest in reducing each
risk, how severe to make the penalties for creating it).
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With this process, each consultation created a unique measurement procedure. Although
it leads to using features that are maximally relevant to participants, such tailoring requires
resources and expertise. If a panel lacks them, it might unwittingly sacriﬁce validity for
relevance, relying on measures that fail to capture the features that it hopes to address.
Havingauniqueprocedureforeachpanelalsoreducesthecomparabilityoftheirconclusions.
Although the panels were asked to focus on issues that could be resolved locally, EPA has an
interest in the overall consistency of its policies, such that expenditures are proportionate to
the risks and the opportunities to reduce them. A uniform procedure would serve that end, as
well as clarifying whether, when two panels express different priorities, the cause is differing
values (regarding which features matter) or realities (regarding the size of the risks)—or just
noisy measurement.
One way to balance tailoring and standardization is to offer each panel a standard set of
features, as a point of departure for its deliberations. The panel can then decide how much
weight, if any, to give each feature. The standard set would be based on research identifying
features that generally matter to people and can be measured well (Davies, 1996; Fischhoff,
2005; Fischhoff et al., 1984; Florig et al., 2001; Morgan et al., 2001).
2.2 Managing risks to the public
As part of an effort to improve risk management, the British government recently endorsed a
standardsetoffeaturesforcharacterizingrisks,asacomplementtoeconomicmeasures.This
procedure was developed through consultation with stakeholder groups and the agencies that
wouldimplementit(HMTreasury,2005).Somefeaturesinthesetarecompromisesbetween
ones that are important, but hard to measure, and more tractable surrogates that approximate
them.TheBritishapproachisinstructive,regardingthechoicesthatmustbemadeincreating
a protocol for counting casualties.
The expected number of deaths is one obvious feature in a set characterizing risks.
However, the British procedure does not treat all deaths as equal. Rather, it represents them
by the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) lost with each death. This metric gives greater
weight to deaths of young people (because more life-years are lost) and of healthy people
(who lose higher quality years). It indirectly assigns a value to morbidity, insofar as health
problems (e.g., chronic pain, paralysis) reduce the quality of people’s remaining years.
Recognizing that people may care about more than just the expected number and “quality”
ofcasualties,theproposalofferssixfeatures,chosentospanthespaceofadditionalconcerns:
(a) how familiar citizens are with the risk, (b) how well scientists understand the processes
creatingandcontrollingit,(c)howequitablyitseffectsaredistributed,(d)howmuch“dread”
it evokes among those contemplating it, (e) how voluntary and controllable exposure to it
is, and (f) how well citizens trust those managing it. Studies have found that many other
potentiallyrelevantfeaturesofrisksarestronglycorrelatedwiththeonesinthisset(Fischhoff
et al., 1978; Lowrance, 1976; Slovic, 1987; Starr, 1969). As a result, any feature missing
from the set is likely to be represented by a related one.
Each of these features might be relevant to assessing casualties in conﬂict zones. “Lost
life years” captures some of the extra tragedy of casualties among young people. “Quality”
is lost when survivors bear physical or psychological scars. Some ways of dying evoke
more “dread” than others. Losses are even more painful, when they are attributed to the
incompetence or callousness of one’s own authorities, making them unworthy of trust. And
so on.
Althoughitmightbeaninterestingexercisetoapplythesefeaturestorecordingcasualties,
the set emerged from a very different discourse than that associated with conﬂict zones.
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Speciﬁcally,itaroseinresponsetothelimitstocost-beneﬁtaccountingforprojectevaluation:
Despite some consensus among economists about how to monetize many impacts, projects
with similar costs and beneﬁts are sometimes regulated differently. The features in the
British set seek to capture the sources of these differences and subject them to explicit
evaluation. However, although risk regulation deals with casualties, those are unwanted
byproductsofprojectsexpectedtobringbeneﬁts.Inconﬂicts,harmisthegoal.Ananalytical-
deliberativeframeworkforassessingcasualtiesinconﬂictzonesrequiresitsownanalysisand
deliberation, recognizing that malevolence. We now consider what that analytical content
mightbe,followedbyadiscussionofthedeliberativeprocessthatcouldcreateandimplement
a protocol for counting casualties.
3 A framework for counting casualties
Following the analytical form, but not the content, of these approaches to deﬁning risks,
each casualty would be characterized in terms of a standard set of features. The members
of that set would be determined by a deliberative process that seeks to balance tailoring (in
order to address speciﬁc parties’ concerns) and generality (in order to create robust methods,
producing results that are comparable across conﬂicts).
For example, a simple set of features might be:
(nationality,military status,date of death,location). (1)
In the Middle East conﬂict, a casualty might be (Israeli, non-combatant, 5/23/04, market-
place) or (Palestinian, Hamas member, 6/15/03, apartment). A more complex scheme might
also include age, sex, and method (e.g., Qassam rocket, gun, improvised explosive device,
suicide bomb, beating).
Developing a standard set of features would begin with technical experts (e.g., forensic
pathologists, political theorists, anthropologists) preparing a set of candidates. A properly
constituted body of stakeholders would then select the relevant features, starting from, but
not bound by, the experts’ initial proposal. That deliberative process would focus on the
features that matter most to stakeholders, tempered by knowledge (provided by technical
experts) of how well each can be measured—given the available science, resources, and ﬁeld
conditions. The standard set would have inclusion features, determining whether a casualty
is considered at all, and distinguishing features, for how that consideration proceeds. Each
inclusion feature deﬁnes an at-risk population.
Forexample,twoinclusionfeaturesintheU.S.government’spublicreportingofcasualties
in Iraq appear to be nationality and military status (the ﬁrst two features in (1)). Each of
these features has two possible values: (U.S., non-U.S.), (military, non-military). The rules
applying these inclusion features lead to considering distinguishing features only for U.S.
military dead. Describing casualties in these terms may address the essential need to honor
fallen American soldiers and the instrumental need to determine death beneﬁts. It may
partially address the instrumental question of whether the war is worth the sacriﬁce (given
some measure of its beneﬁt).
For individuals whose deaths qualify for further description, the date and location of
death (the other two features in (1)) provide instrumentally useful information for charting
the war’s course (as in Department of Defense, 2005). The location of death might serve the
essential purpose of determining whether the dead merit special honors (e.g., by dying in a
particular mission).
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Not recording deaths of civilian contractors might express the essential value that military
service is a prerequisite for national honors or the instrumental value that their deaths are
irrelevant to evaluating the war’s progress. It might also reﬂect a desire to avoid the instru-
mental value that recording contractors’ deaths would have for the war’s critics, whose case
is advanced by a larger toll. Whatever its motives, this aspect of the U.S. casualty reporting
protocol fails to serve anyone who needs that information, for essential or instrumental pur-
poses. That might include U.S. policy makers, for whom a record of contractor deaths could
reveal changes in the risk environment, relevant to anticipating resource needs and domestic
support (Bergner, 2005).
Very different inclusion features were used by Roberts et al. (2004) and Burnham et al.
(2006), who sought to count all Iraqi casualties from the conﬂict, including indirect ones
due to impaired sanitation, emergency services, and healthcare. As a concession to ﬁeld
conditions, they intensely investigated a sample of cases, then extrapolated to the country as
a whole—estimating between 400,000 and 800,000 more deaths in the three and a half years
after the invasion, compared to what would otherwise have been expected. Although the
professional judgment in their choice of statistical procedures has evoked some controversy,
their choice of features has been little challenged—except for their not attempting to distin-
guish between combatants and non-combatants (defended as possibly putting interviewers at
risk, without yielding trustworthy reports). The methodological debates reﬂected, in part, the
instrumentalneedsofthoseeagertosupportorunderminethestudy’shighcasualtyestimates
(proportionate to 5–10 million excess deaths in the U.S.). From that perspective, accepting
all the critics’ (or all the supporters’) claims would, likely, lead to similar conclusions about
the scope of the casualties—although perhaps not regarding their acceptability.
Thenexttwosectionsillustratetheanalyticalissuesincountingcasualties,astheyemerge
in the protocols applied in two Middle East conﬂict zones. Our inferences regarding the
values motivating these protocols attempt to give a feeling for the issues that such efforts
mustconfront,nottosecond-guess,criticize,orpraisetheseefforts.Wehopethatthisanalysis
will facilitate the recording of casualties in all conﬂict zones.
4 Case study 1: Iraq Body Count
4.1 Introduction
The Iraq Body Count (IBC) project seeks to “establish an independent and comprehensive
public database of media-reported civilian deaths in Iraq resulting directly from military
action by the USA and its allies,” [http://www.iraqbodycount.net/background.htm]3 in the
period beginning January 1, 2003. To this end, it includes any civilian death reported by two
or more members of a list of recognized media sources. On January 1, 2006, IBC reported a
minimum of 27,707 and a maximum of 31,232 civilian deaths in Iraq.
The IBC’s primary inclusion criteria are date (after January 1, 2003) and civilian status.
Its purpose is primarily essential: “This project aims to record single-mindedly...one key
and immutable index of the fruits of war: the death toll of innocents. ...It is to these all
too easily disregarded victims of violence that Iraq Body Count is dedicated, and we are
resolute that they, too, shall have their memorials.” Two instrumental goals are (a) allowing
users to “where possible...establish whether there are grounds for criminal proceedings”
3 All quotations are from this site, accessed most recently on January 1, 2006.
SpringerJ Risk Uncertainty
and (b) promoting “public understanding, engagement and support for the human dimension
in war.”
The media reports used by IBC do not address any standard set of features. Rather,
they reﬂect reporters’ (and editors’) intuitive notions and professional norms regarding the
features that their audiences value, within the constraints of what they can collect. Faced
with this reality (and its own resource limits), IBC developed a small set of standard features
that it could extract reliably and transparently, designed “to ensure that each incident is
differentiated from proximate incidents with which it could be potentially confused.” The
features are:
(civilian status,number of deaths,date,time,location,target,weapon). (2)
Thefeaturesaredeﬁnedinwaysintendedtorequireaminimumofprofessionaljudgment.
For example, the “target” is that stated by military sources. Users can interpret that charac-
terization as they wish. The record lists each report’s source, again allowing users freedom
of interpretation (e.g., if they believe that some sources are biased, by politics, intimidation,
or bribery).
As mentioned, the ﬁrst feature, the victims’ civilian status, is an inclusion criterion,
complementing the U.S. policy of recording only U.S. military deaths. Civilian status has
essential value, for honoring those who died, and instrumental value, for making decisions
about the war. Professional judgment is needed when applying this feature during a civil
war or insurgency, insofar as civilian dress does not guarantee non-combatant status. Indeed,
combatant status may be deliberately obscured (e.g., by those who act as couriers or hide
arms). Some roles are inherently ambiguous status (e.g., ofﬁcials in the civilian arm of a
military organization, truck drivers employed by military contractors). Additional profes-
sional judgment is needed when determining whether deaths are ones that “the Occupying
Authority has a binding responsibility to prevent under the Geneva Conventions and
Hague Regulations. This includes civilian deaths resulting from the breakdown in law
and order, and deaths due to inadequate healthcare or sanitation.” [Bold in original.]
For any feature outside the IBC set, analogous questions arise, regarding the value judg-
ments associated with its inclusion and the professional judgments associated with its appli-
cation. For example, victims’ religion and ethnic identity might interest some parties. Those
familiar with Iraqi realities might be able to infer those features, from the media reports
used by IBC, with enough conﬁdence to have some instrumental value (e.g., as measures of
civilianmoraleandcombatantstrategies). Includingthesefeatureswouldviolateanessential
value for those who would treat all civilians equally, while honoring an essential value for
those who care only about their own kind.
4.2 Analytical perspectives
Figure 1 shows the number of deaths recorded in the IBC database, by month. As mentioned,
IBChasstandardizedsomeaspectsoftheprofessionaljudgmentneededtoapplyitsprotocol.
In addition to requiring each incident to appear in two approved sources (with some explicit
exceptions),itrecordsmaximumandminimumvalueswhenmorethanoneappears.Forsome
kinds of ambiguity, it speciﬁes interpretative rules that it characterizes as “conservative,”
in the sense of tending to understate numbers. For example, “when wording used in both
reports refers to ‘people’ instead of civilians, we will include the total ﬁgure as a maximum
but enter ‘0’ into the minimum column unless details are present clearly identifying some or
all of the dead as civilian.” Such precision about uncertainty expresses an essential value, of
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commitment to accuracy and transparency. It should also facilitate the instrumental goal of
effective decision making, which requires understanding data quality. The range of estimates
is so narrow that few choices would be sensitive to whether the high or low value is used.
However, that need not have been the case.
Figure 1 includes the third feature recorded for each report, the date of the deaths. In the
context of each report, it is an essential feature, documenting another aspect of that event.
In the aggregate, it has instrumental value, allowing deaths to be related to other events.
When an entry summarized multiple events, our professional judgment was to treat them as
occurring at a constant rate during the period. That practice addresses the instrumental goal
of revealing broad trends over time, while obscuring responses to speciﬁc events. The peak
in March and April 2003 reﬂects the initial invasion, while the smaller peak in April 2004
reﬂects the ﬁrst assault on Fallujah.4
The fourth feature, time of day, has similar essential value for documenting each incident.
It has instrumental value for evaluating hypotheses about patterns in violent acts (e.g., at the
beginning of the work day, as markets close, during prayers).
Each of the other IBC features (target, location, and weapon) could also have both
essential and instrumental value. For example, attacks on holy places or clerics could be
intrinsically important, as well as revealing their perpetrators’ strategies. Suicide bombers
(as weapons) might reﬂect (or violate) essential values, as well as reveal strategies and social
currents (Atran, 2006). They are important inputs to Dardagan et al.’s (2005) analyses of
these casualties.
Figure2presentsasubsetofthemultipledeathreports:monthlytotalsof“violentkillings”
recorded at the Baghdad city morgue. These reports represent one location, with perhaps
the most consistent reporting practices over time.5 They have value for those who care
about deaths in the capital. They also provide input to the professional judgment needed to
4 IBC used special procedures for Fallujah: http: //www.iraqbodycount.net/details/x360 notes.php.
5 Sly (2005) reports the morgue numbers for June and July 2005 as 879 and 1100, respectively, with 60%
from shootings. See also Fisk (2005) and Marcus (2006), among others.
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interpret all reports. For example, Baghdad morgue deaths were high compared to those in
the news media (Fig. 1) soon after the invasion, suggesting underreporting. Their general
level parallels that in the media from late 2003 on, suggesting stabilized reporting. If so, then
onecanmore conﬁdentlytry toexplain patternsoverthatperiod.Forexample,theseemingly
inverse patterns during the Fallujah campaigns suggest that the situation in Baghdad may
have affected and been affected by events in Fallujah; perhaps a shift in violence, perhaps a
shift in reporters’ attentions.
4.3 Summary
IBC seeks to describe each death in terms of six features: noncombatant status, date of death,
time of death, target, location, weapon. Each feature can have essential or instrumental
value, depending on how the reports are used. Each reﬂects IBC’s view of what matters,
conditioned on what measurement is possible, given its resources and source material. IBC
formalizes some of the professional judgment that the recording requires. Dardagan et al.
(2005) specify additional aspects in their analyses of these reports, as other researchers
would have to do when conducting their own analyses. If IBC were party designing a
standard protocol collaboratively, it would want to ensure that its features are retained, while
perhaps having to accept other features that it found unimportant or even offensive.
5 Case study 2: B’tselem: casualties in second intifada
B’tselem (2005), an Israeli human rights NGO, has compiled casualty statistics for another
ongoing conﬂict, the second intifada. B’tselem characterizes deaths in terms of ﬁve features
that we have extracted from their 13-category scheme:
(nationality of dead,military status of killer,age of dead,location,date). (3)
Nationality is an essential feature for some people to consider—and for others to ignore
(in order to treat deaths among all peoples equally). Including it serves the former, while
offending the latter. Those who deny the essential value of nationality might still ﬁnd it to
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have instrumental value, providing clues to the nature of the conﬂict and, perhaps, ways to
reduce it.
B’tselemmakesnodistinctionbetweenPalestinianciviliansandcombatants.Somepeople
might view that omission as failure to consider a feature with both essential and instrumental
value. As in Iraq, assessing combatant status would require professional judgment, given a
civilian population with many people mobilized for the struggle and some willing to conceal
combatants. Conversely, B’tselem does distinguish among Israeli civilians and combatants.
Some people might ﬁnd that distinction objectionable, arguing that Israel’s whole society
is mobilized, not to mention those civilians who are soldiers on leave or in the reserves.
Some people might object to treating Israelis and Palestinians differently in any way. In
assessing this feature, B’tselem’s professional judgment is to categorize Israeli casualties as
combatants only if on active duty.
In terms of age of death, B’tselem distinguishes between adults and minors. Dardagan
et al. (2005) saw a need to distinguish minors under age 2 from older ones. One might
also choose to distinguish older adults, for essential reasons (respecting the elderly) or
instrumental ones (identifying those less likely to be combatants).
In terms of the location, B’tselem distinguishes between deaths in Israel and the occupied
territories.Thatdistinctionmatterstothoseholdingpositionsonthelegitimacyofeachside’s
presenceindifferentplaces—andtheessentialmeaningofdeathsthere.Ininstrumentalterms,
the location captures some of the conﬂict’s development.
As with IBC, date of death is unlikely to have essential value (except perhaps for identify-
ingdeathsinholyperiods).However,itshouldhaveinstrumentalvalueforunderstandingthe
conﬂict (e.g., ﬂuctuations over time, time dependencies in deaths on the two sides, changes
in relative rates).
5.1 Analysis
WepresentdataforkillingsofIsraelisbyPalestiniansandviceversa,forSeptember29,2000-
August 7, 2005, from http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp.6 (The data
setalsoincludeskillingsofPalestiniansbyPalestinians,amongotherstatistics.)Weaggregate
these data in several ways, selected to illuminate the essential and instrumental needs that
might be served by these features, without presuming to know B’tselem’s philosophy. Figure
3 depicts the data in terms of the nationality of the dead and the date of death, grouped by
quarter.Thetimeperiodforaggregatingreportsisamatterofprofessionaljudgment.Smaller
periods can reveal ﬁner changes, but have greater chance ﬂuctuations.
Those who distinguish the dead by nationality may want to examine each side’s deaths
more closely. Figure 4 divides Palestinian deaths according to two additional features:
military status of the killer and location of death. The top curve dominates the ﬁgure.
It presents “Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the occupied territories” (in
B’tselem’s language). The other two curves present Palestinians killed by Israeli security
forces in Israel and by Israeli civilians in Israel or the territories. Although relatively rare
(in this violent context), these deaths might have particular essential or instrumental value
(e.g., if the 36 killings in the last category are seen as representing a high level of vigilante
6 The data have two known gaps: (1) data on Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinians within Israel, for May
and June 2005. Historically, the monthly number has typically been between 0 and 2, peaking at 13. (2) The
July 2005 report of two Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians does not specify the age group of the dead. In
previous months, the number of minors has typically been zero and never more than one.
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action). Fuller analysis might consider exposure to these risks, that is, the extent to which
Palestinians are safer while in Israel or just less likely to be there.
Figure 5 shows analogous data for Israeli dead. The largest category is civilians killed
within Israel, followed by security forces killed in the occupied territories, civilians killed in
theterritories,andsecurityforceskilledwithinIsrael.Thedifferencesinratesacrosslocations
are much smaller for Israelis than for Palestinians. Where deaths occur has essential value
for those who view Israeli activities in the occupied territories as illegitimate or imperative.
Location would have instrumental value, for understanding the course of the conﬂict, if,
for example, deaths in Israel evoke more vigorous reactions—because they are seen as
threatening the entire population, not just settlers. Here, too, a fuller analysis would consider
exposure, forIsraelis in Israelandthe territories. Risk perceptions may bedisproportionately
inﬂuencedbythetotalnumberofincidents,relativetothenumberofpeopleexposed(Slovic,
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1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2004), so that both raw and
relative frequencies may have instrumental value for predicting public reactions.
Figure 6 shows deaths among minors, relative to overall deaths for both peoples. This
distinction has essential value for those who feel special revulsion when young people are
killed. It has instrumental value for those who believe that such deaths have special impacts
(on policy, hatred, education, etc.), but not for those who see either society as so fully
mobilizedthatitnolongermatterswhodies.Afulleranalysismightcomparetheproportions
of deaths among minors in the two populations over time. A matter of professional judgment
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Q4 2000
Q1 2001
Q2 2001
Q3 2001
Q4 2001
Q1 2002
Q2 2002
Q3 2002
Q4 2002
Q1 2003
Q2 2003
Q3 2003
Q4 2003
Q1 2004
Q2 2004
Q3 2004
Q4 2004
Q1 2005
Q2 2005
Q3 2005
quarter
Israelis
Israeli minors
Palestinians
Palestinian minors
Fig. 6 Israeli and Palestinian deaths, by age. Source: B’tselem (2005)
SpringerJ Risk Uncertainty
is using the legal age of majority (18) as the cutoff, which might reﬂect maturity, autonomy,
military status, or other considerations.
5.2 Summary
B’tselem uses a complex coding scheme, from which we extracted ﬁve core features. Each
could have both essential and instrumental value, depending on users’ needs. To some
extent, any feature with essential value for Palestinians or Israelis has instrumental value for
observers, insofar as it predicts future events, even if they disagree about its interpretation
(e.g., the status of the territories). We have suggested some topics for such research; others
are possible (e.g., the effects of targeted assassinations or suicide bombings). We have also
indicated some controversial aspects of deciding which features to include and ignore, as
well as their speciﬁcation.
Radlauer (2002) approaches the same recording task in an analytically similar way, using
features that he selects in an avowedly biased way. Believing that others’ data are unfair to
Israel, he identiﬁes features that he expects to increase the sense of tragedy for Israeli deaths
and lessen that for Palestinian deaths. One such feature is the victim’s sex (not considered
by B’tselem). Adding this feature reveals Palestinian deaths to be overwhelming male, while
about one third of Israeli dead are women. A second added feature reﬁnes “age” to include
more than just the minor-adult distinction. Looking at ﬁner gradations reveals that dead
Israeli adults are much more likely to be over 45, compared to Palestinian adults. Adding
these two features might serve both essential purposes (for those differentially pained by
deaths of women and older people) and instrumental ones (e.g., by clarifying combatant
status).
Radlauer speciﬁes procedures for reducing the role of professional judgment in assessing
these features and describes his attempts to create neutral category labels. In one sense,
having more information about casualties should only be helpful. Those who disagree about
the importance of a feature (e.g., sex) or distinction (e.g., precise age) can just ignore it.
However, if Radlauer’s reﬁnements tip observers’ views in one direction, then adding yet
more features might tip it back. Given adequate resources, each party could create its own
recording protocol. However, where that condition is not met (e.g., Radlauer describes his
limited access to Palestinian data), the recording protocol can be a source of added tension.
6 Conclusions
Measuring social phenomena is, inevitably, a value-laden act. It determines whose data
get collected, recognizing the legitimacy of their concerns and helping them to fulﬁll their
missions. Measurement protocols reﬂect a balance of power, perhaps informed by scientiﬁc
understanding.Recordingcasualtiesinconﬂictzonesconfrontsspecialcasesofthesegeneral
issues. We propose a framework for addressing them explicitly, drawing on experiences in
risk analysis.
The case studies illustrate the issues revealed by implementing such a framework. Each
suggests the essential and instrumental value assumptions underlying an existing recording
protocol.Althoughthetwosourcesdonotreferenceoneanother,theyaddresssimilarfeatures
and offer similar guidance regarding the professional judgment involved in their application.
Both consider whether the dead person was a combatant (IBC excludes those who appear
to be; B’tselem marks the distinction). Both consider the number, date, and location of the
death (with IBC preserving ﬁner distinctions). IBC lists the weapon used; B’tselem does
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not. A door-to-door survey in Iraq, conducted by CIVIC in 2003 (http://civilians.info/iraq/),
had similar features (age, sex, date of death, location of death, war event), along with addi-
tional ones, focused on essential features of each deceased’s life (marital status, occupation,
monthly income, dependents).
Assuming that they are executed faithfully, such protocols should only be for the good.
They offer data that some parties need and others can ignore. However, the processes
prompting their creation are troubling, insofar as each was motivated by dissatisfaction
with ofﬁcial recording procedures. Any ﬁght over measurement adds to the tension and
distrust of a conﬂict. As a result, there may be value to having a standard protocol, whose
adoption would be, in legal terms, a rebuttable presumption. Like the British approach to
characterizing risks, that standard protocol would serve as a point of departure, which the
parties could adapt—or reject. In some cases, adopting a default protocol might allow the
parties to avoid directly facing difﬁcult value issues, by saying that they are following an
international convention or custom.
When the standard protocol is used, the legacy of previous applications should facilitate
data collection and analysis. When changes are made, that should be with a better grasp
of the professional and value judgments involved, compared to creating a protocol ad hoc.
Having a collection of reports, describing casualties in comparable terms, should improve
the understanding of conﬂicts. If that knowledge reduces their toll, then it will honor the
dead, adding to the essential value of recording their deaths.
6.1 A proposal
The analytical-deliberative process advocated by the National Research Council (1996)
offers a structured way to identify whatever common ground exists, in terms of generally
acceptable measurement protocols. Its ﬁrst step is identifying the parties with standing to
affect the procedure. Exclusion may reﬂect a value judgment (i.e., that their opinion does
not matter) or a professional judgment (i.e., that they are not qualiﬁed to represent their
values). The second step is having technical experts prepare a draft proposal, drawing on
their understanding of the conﬂict and the parties’ needs. The third step is convening the
parties to revise the draft proposal, identifying the breadth and depth of measurement that
provide the best investment of available resources.
Although technical specialists’ expertise is essential to this process, their own values are
not relevant, unless given standing. That is more likely for their instrumental values (which
could produce understanding that informs policy choices) than for their essential values
(except insofar as they reﬂect those of ordinary citizens). The experts would need to reassure
lay participants that they have not rigged the procedure in some subtle way, as has been
alleged with risk analysts (O’Brien, 2000).
Theinstitutionconveningsuchaprocessmustbeseenasbothethicallyneutralandtechni-
callycompetent.Thatis,itmustrespectallfeaturesthatthepartiesvalueandunderstandhow
well different measurement procedures capture them. In the context of counting casualties,
that requires expertise in the social, cultural, religious, political, and economic features that
have essential value for the parties, as well as in the selection of features with instrumental
value for understanding conﬂicts.
Preparing an analytical-deliberative process can pursue parallel methodological and
institution-building tracks, with the former developing draft protocols to use in venues cre-
ated by the latter. Thus, the method (which requires “just” material resources and technical
expertise)wouldbeready,whenthevenue(whichrequireswillingparties)exists.Proceeding
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in parallel allows institutional negotiations to inform method development, while creating
prototypes that help to explain the process.
The method is ready for the parties’ consideration when it has a complete set of possible
features, along with at least rudimentary assessment procedures. Its preparation should
include ﬁeld tests, with individuals drawn from the target audiences, in order to improve its
practicality and acceptability (e.g., by revealing unintended sensitivities to how features are
labeled). Both IBC and B’tselem attempt to describe their features as literally as possible,
in order to avoid taking sides (e.g., in situations where one person’s terrorist is another’s
freedom ﬁghter). Their success is an empirical question.
The institutional arrangements for deliberating a protocol are ready when the parties have
accepted the ground rules for the discussion. Those rules should include who represents each
party, how public to make the proceedings, how to represent residual disagreements, and
how binding the conclusions will be. As mentioned, one possibility is including as many
features as possible, within the resource constraints on measurement. Doing so allows each
party to satisfy its instrumental and essential needs, by considering the features that it values
and ignoring the rest.
Looking at the common elements of the recording protocols considered above, the stan-
dard representation might include, at a minimum, for each dead person:
(nationality,combatant status,age,sex,family status) (4)
and for each incident:
(date,location,weapon,combatant status of killer). (5)
Where protocols share a feature, they sometimes differ in details, such as which critical
ages to consider (2? 18? 45? 65?). As with the choice of features, an analytical-deliberative
process might be served best by preserving as many details as possible, among those with
essential or instrumental value for any party. Then, each party can use whichever details
address its needs. A successful process should evoke a spirit of compromise, aided by
technical experts able to identify efﬁcient ways to achieve multiple objectives. That design
could take advantage of the parties’ different strengths in data collection and analysis. For
example, government record keepers may have more resources and better-trained staff.
NGOs may have special credibility with affected communities, allowing them to elicit
candid reports on sensitive topics (e.g., cause of death, ethnic background, immigration
status) and gain access to places too dangerous for ofﬁcials to visit. Collaboration over
the protocol might further understanding among the parties, just as other communications
among technical experts (e.g., weapons inspectors, hotline operators) have opened channels
between otherwise hostile nations.
7 Hurricane Katrina: A Coda
Many observers likened the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to a war zone. Even before the
waters had begun to be pumped from New Orleans, concerns arose regarding the counting of
its dead. Charges arose that not all casualties would be counted, in terms echoing those heard
aboutIraqandfed,similarly,byreportsofjournalistsbeingdeniedaccesstoobservethedead
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(Neal,2005;Vega,2005)7 andofcontractsbeinglettoaﬁrmclosetotheBushAdministration
(Kenyon International). Contracting with any commercial ﬁrm was problematic for those
who felt that volunteers should prepare the dead for burial (Bunch, 2005; Confehr, 2005).
On September 9, 2005, the National Association of Medical Examiners (2005) expanded
its Death Registry to include hurricane-related deaths. Adding that feature could have served
the essential purpose articulated by Dr. Louis Cataldie, Louisiana’s chief medical examiner,
“I think it’s important for everybody to understand that it’s about the individual. It’s about
the little lady in the Superdome in all that ﬁlth who looks at you and you can’t do anything
for. And somebody hands you a limp kid. And when you come back to her, she’s dead. I
don’t want people to lose track of that. We handle every person as the individual and with
the dignity they deserve” (O’Neill, 2005).
However, the Death Registry goes further, distinguishing between fatalities directly and
indirectly due to the hurricane. The former include deaths like drowning; the latter include
death from cardiovascular disease exacerbated by relocation or trafﬁc accidents during evac-
uation.8 This distinction, presumably, serves instrumental needs, such as resolving insurance
andliabilityclaimsorfocusingafter-incidentreviews,aimedatfuturepreparations.Whatever
its purposes, the protocol beneﬁts from the quality assurance provided by medical examin-
ers, implementing consensually deﬁned procedures (Centers for Disease Control, 2003; U.S.
Department of Justice, 1999; Wecht and Weedn, 2005). Some of their best work in Iraq has
gone into exhuming Sadaam Hussein’s victims (Drew and Mabile, 2005).
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